Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2080/626
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dc.contributor.authorKulkarni, S-
dc.contributor.authorJena, D-
dc.contributor.authorJena, S K-
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-14T04:40:26Z-
dc.date.available2008-03-14T04:40:26Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Computer Science and Security, Vol 1, Iss 1, P 11 -18en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2080/626 http://ijcss.org/Volume1/Issue1/V1_I1_011.pdf-
dc.descriptionCopyright for the paper belongs to the publisheren
dc.description.abstractIn the past, several key agreement protocols are proposed on password based mechanism. These protocols are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Storing plain text version of password on server is not secure always. In this paper we utilize the service of a trusted third party, i.e., the Key Distribution server (KDS) for key agreement between the hosts. Now-a-days in large working environments two party key agreement protocols are being rarely used. In this proposed scheme, instead of storing plain text version of password we store one way hash of the password at the server. Every host and server agree upon family of commutative one-way hash functions, using which host authentication is done when a host applies for session key with KDS. Host establishes one time key with server using which server authentication is done. Due to this man-in-the middle attacks are defeated. The proposed protocol is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.en
dc.format.extent104798 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.subjectKey agreementen
dc.subjectDiffie-Hellmanen
dc.subjectOnline guessing attacksen
dc.subjectDictionary attacksen
dc.titleA Novel Secure Key Agreement Protocol using Trusted Third Partyen
dc.typeArticleen
Appears in Collections:Journal Articles

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